CASE LAWS

INTERROGATION-

RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS, 446 US 291 (1980):

Under Miranda v. Arizona, police are forbidden from continuing an interrogation after a suspect has invoked their Sixth Amendment right to legal counsel. In Innis, the court determined that interrogation encompasses not only direct questioning but also it's "functional equivalent"; that is, "any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." 

USE OF DECEPTION-

REDMOND V. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (2010):

The defendant, a convicted felon, listed his house for sale with a real estate agent. Police officers, posing as prospective buyers, had the agent show them the house in hopes of discovering firearms. During the viewing, the officers observed several firearms in plain sight. They later obtained a search warrant and searched the house. The defendant was charged with possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. The court ruled that the police's use of deception was permissible. Since the defendant had listed his home for sale, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, knowing it would be shown to prospective buyers. 

PHYSICAL SEARCH-

US V. HARRIS, 313 F.3D 1228 (2002):

The odor of illegal narcotics coming from a person is probable cause to stop and search them. 

RILEY V. CALIFORNIA, 13-132 (SCOTUS 2014):

Police cannot search a phone without a search warrant unless exigent circumstances exist. 

US V. BRIXEN, 18-1636 (2018):

A phone notification can be used as evidence if no further manipulation of the phone is required. A visible phone notification has no reasonable expectation of privacy. 

MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN, 6210 (SCOTUS 2019):

When a drunk person is unconscious, a warrant is not needed to draw blood to determine alcohol levels. This is because alcohol may dissipate from the blood before a search warrant can be obtained. 

CONSENT TO SEARCH-

CHAPMAN V. US, 365 U.S. 610 (1961):

A landlord cannot consent to police entering and searching a tenant's home. 

STONER V. CALIFORNIA, 376 US 483 (1964):

A hotel guest is treated like a tenant, so a hotel employee cannot consent to a room search while the guest is occupying it. 

US V. RUSSELL, 11-30030 (2012):

When a person consents to a search for drugs, it can include a pat-down of the groin area. 

STONER V. CALIFORNIA, 376 US 483 (1964):

Police may enter a motel room rented by a wanted person without a warrant if they have reason to believe the person is inside. A person renting a motel room loses any expectation of privacy after checkout time, at which point management can consent to a search. 

STOP AND FRISK-

TERRY V. OHIO, 392 US 1 (1968):

An officer can briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, long enough to dispel the suspicion or to allow it to rise to the level of probable cause for an arrest. The officer is also permitted to conduct a limited 'frisk' search of the person without a warrant. Before the officer can perform a frisk search, they must: 

1. Have articulable facts that the person may be armed with a weapon.

2. Limit the search to patting down the outer garments of the suspect to feel for objects that might be weapons.

3. Only reach inside the clothing after feeling such objects.

FLORDIA V. ROYER, 460 US 491 (1983):

An investigative detention must be conducted in a manner that is no more intrusive than necessary to establish or dispel the officer's suspicions. 

ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW, 528 US 119 (2000):

The unprovoked flight of a person upon seeing the police in a high-crime area gives the officer reasonable suspicion to pursue and detain them. 

DETAINMENT-

STUFFLEBEAM V. HARRIS, 06-4046 (2008):

Police cannot arrest a passenger in a vehicle solely for refusing to show identification if the officer has no reasonable suspicion that they have committed a crime. 

ARREST-

US V. ROBINSON, 414 U.S. 218 (1973):

"A police officer can conduct a search incident to arrest that can go beyond just a pat frisk. The search is also not restricted by the nature of the offense." What this means is that anytime you arrest someone, regardless of the reason, you may search them beyond a frisk. 

US V. SANTANA, 427 U.S. 38 (1976):

The doorway of a residence is considered a public place under the Fourth Amendment. This means that if you observe a suspect in their doorway and give chase, the 'hot pursuit' exception applies, allowing an officer to follow the suspect into their home to make an arrest.  

STEAGALD V. US, 451 U.S. 204 (1981):

A search warrant is needed to arrest someone in the home of a third party. 

US V. FINLEY, 477 F.3D 250 (2007):

Police may search the internal phone records and text messages on a cell phone seized from a person during a lawful arrest when exigent circumstances are present.

VEHICLE STOPS-

CARROL V. US, 267 U.S. 132 (1925):

Police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle stopped in traffic if there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence. The search without a warrant is justified by the exigent circumstance that a vehicle stopped in traffic could be quickly moved out of the city or jurisdiction of the investigating agency. 

US V. ROE, 495 F.2D 600 (1974):

A suspect does not need to be in their vehicle at the time of arrest for the vehicle to be searched incident to that arrest. The suspect merely needs to have possession of the vehicle at the scene of the arrest. The entire passenger area may be searched. 

TEXAS V. WHITE, 423 US 67 (1975):

The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the Chambers case. If an officer has probable cause to search a vehicle after stopping it, they can move the vehicle to the station to conduct the search. 

SOUTH DAKOTA V. OPPERMAN, 428 U.S. 364 (1976):

A vehicle impounded for parking violations can be unlocked, entered, and inventoried by the police as part of their 'caretaking' function without violating the Fourth Amendment. Any drugs, evidence, or contraband discovered during this process can be lawfully seized. 

PENNSYLVANIA V. MIMMS, 434 US 106 (1977):

The driver can be ordered out of a vehicle without suspicion during routine traffic stops, as the officer's safety greatly outweighs any inconvenience to the driver. 

US V. CORTEZ, 449 US 411 (1981):

A vehicle can be stopped based on reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, not just for a traffic offense. 

US V. PARKER, 72 F.3D 1444 (1995):

The smell of illegal narcotics and the discovery of contraband on the defendant's person constituted probable cause to search the passenger area and trunk. 

US V. ELLIOT, 96-8061 (1997):

An officer conducting a traffic stop must allow the driver to continue with their day after a citation is issued without further delay, unless: 

1. During the traffic stop, the officer develops reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed.

2. The driver voluntarily consents to additional questioning.

MARYLAND V. WILSON, 519 U.S. 408 (1997):

Pennsylvania V. Mimms applies to passengers as well, for the same reasons.

US V. BARNES, 156 F.3D 1244 (1998):

It is reasonable for an officer to remove the passenger and have them stand away from the vehicle during a K-9 sniff. This is done for officer safety and to minimize distractions for the K-9.  

WYOMING V. HOUGHTON, 526 U.S. 295 (1999):

If there is probable cause to search a car, officers may search all areas capable of concealing the object of the search, including passengers' belongings. 

US V. WILLIAMS, 419 F.3D 1029 (2005):

An officer can order a passenger back into the vehicle if they attempt to exit. The officer's safety outweighs the minimal intrusion on the passenger's liberty. 

PRADO NAVARETTE V. CALIFORNIA, 12-9490 (SCOTUS 2014):

Police can stop a vehicle based on anonymous tips that it was driving recklessly. Providing a vehicle description and license plate number in the tip can strengthen the reasonable suspicion. 

HEIEN V. NORTH CAROLINA, 13-604 (SCOTUS 2014):

If an officer makes a mistake in law but believes their mistake to be correct at the time, their reasonable suspicion will still stand. 

US V. BURGESS, 13-3571 (2014):

Several 911 calls reported a vehicle involved in a shots-fired incident, providing reasonable suspicion for officers to stop Burgess. 

US V. BURWELL, 18-13039 (2019):

An officer may question someone after a traffic stop is finished, but the individual is free to leave if they wish. If consent to search is obtained after the traffic stop, any evidence found is admissible in court, as the individual volunteered to stay and be searched. 

USE OF FORCE-

TENNESSEE V. GARNER, 471 U.S. 1 (USSC, 1985):

The use of deadly force to stop a fleeing felon is not justified unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and complies with the following requirements: the officer must have probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. 

MITCHELL V. SCHLABACH, NO. 16-1522 (6TH CIR 2017):

A Michigan police officer stopped Mitchell for a traffic violation based on a report that he had assaulted someone and was driving under the influence. When the officer activated his lights, Mitchell initially stopped but then sped away, leading to a car chase. He fled through neighborhoods, driving at speeds of 100 mph in pouring rain. After a ten-minute pursuit, Mitchell crashed into a ditch.

The officer drew his gun and approached Mitchell, who had exited his vehicle. The officer repeatedly ordered him to get on the ground, but instead, Mitchell turned and walked toward the officer with clenched fists and wide eyes, refusing to follow any commands. Despite the officer pointing his gun at him, Mitchell closed the gap and approached to within approximately 21 feet.

The officer shot him once. However, Mitchell continued to approach the officer, prompting a second shot that ultimately killed him. A family member subsequently sued the officer for excessive use of force. The court held that the officer was justified in his actions, noting that he was alone in an unpopulated area after a high-speed chase. The court found that Mitchell disregarded the gun pointed at him and charged the officer, thereby justifying the use of deadly force. The officer was granted qualified immunity.